The objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of ownership structure on the risk taking behavior of European commercial banks. We consider five categories of shareholders (managers/directors, institutional investors, non financial companies, individuals and families, and banks). Controlling for various factors, we find that asset risk is lower for banks where a higher proportion of total stocks is held by families and individuals who have less diversified portfolios. We also find that the probability of default of banks is higher when non financial companies or institutional investors hold a higher proportion of total equity. However, these results do not hold for listed banks in which non financial companies hold higher stakes suggesting that the market might be limiting the risk-taking incentives of such shareholders.
Introduction
The last three decades have been characterized by repeated banking crises (the current financial crisis of 2008, the US savings and loans debacle of the eighties, the Mexican crisis, the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian financial crises, etc.). Such episodes highlight the inherently unstable nature of banking and the tendency that banks have towards excessive risk-taking. In this paper, we aim to focus on one of the driving forces behind the risk-taking incentives of banks, namely shareholders' behavior and their incentives to take higher risk. The issue of ownership structure is of particular interest for the banking industry as several factors interact and alter governance, such as the quality of bank regulation and supervision and the opacity of bank assets. Moreover, banking systems faced major changes during the last 20 years. With financial deregulation and market integration, the scope of activities of banks has been completely reshaped ranging from traditional intermediation products to an array of new businesses. These trends led to a substantial consolidation in the banking industry and consequently to significant changes in ownership and capital structure.
Also, institutional ownership of common stock has increased substantially over the past twenty years. In terms of shareholding size, expertise in processing information and monitoring managers, institutional investors (investment companies, investment advisors, pension funds, etc.) are very different from atomistic individual investors. This might also imply changes in corporate governance and in banks' behavior in terms of risk-taking.
However, it is also well known that for publicly traded banks risk-taking incentives can be mitigated by market forces, and therefore such developments cannot be assessed without considering incentives driven by financial markets in terms of discipline (Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001 ). In the new Basel Capital Accord, market discipline is one of three pillars, along with capital regulation (Pillar 1) and banking supervision (Pillar 2). The idea is to rely on market forces to enhance banking supervision and therefore market discipline is expected to play an important role. In this context, our goal is to check if market discipline is actually effective in influencing the risk-taking incentives of different types of shareholders. To our knowledge there has been no research on whether risk-taking behavior is different in privately owned banks and publicly owned banks under different ownership profiles. Kwan (2004) , working on a sample of US bank holding companies (BHC), finds that loan quality and earnings variability are not different between traded BHCs and privately held BHCs. One of our aims is to assess the risk-taking behavior of banks by combining the two interrelated dimensions that are ownership structure and market discipline.
It has been stressed in the theoretical and empirical literature that agency problems and risk-taking behavior are different according to the nature of the shareholder. A first issue is the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Theory indicates that shareholders with a diversified portfolio are motivated to take more risk for a higher expected return whereas managers take less risk to protect their position and personal benefits, and preserve their acquired human capital (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Esty, 1998; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . Empirically, Saunders et al (1990) are the first to test the relationship between banks' ownership structure and their risk-taking incentives. They find a positive relationship between managerial stockownership (proportion of stock held by managers) and risk taking. Moreover, they find that banks controlled by shareholders take more risk than banks controlled by managers. A number of studies, following Saunders et al. (1990) , find a significant effect of ownership concentration on risk-taking but without any consensus on the sign of such a relationship. If some studies find a negative relationship, others obtain U-shaped relationships (or inverse Ushaped) between ownership and risk (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Chen, et al., 1998; Anderson and Fraser, 2000) . U-shaped relationships between ownership and risk-taking could be explained by managers' entrenchment. Moreover, Sullivan and Spong (2007) show that stock ownership by hired managers is positively linked with bank risk, meaning that under certain conditions hired managers operate their bank more closely in line with stockholder interests.
Another issue well developed in the literature is the comparison of the performance (profitability and asset quality) of state-owned banks compared to their private counterparts (domestic and foreign banks). Agency costs within government bureaucracy can result in weak managerial incentives and misallocation of resources. According to the agency cost view, managers exert less effort than their private counterparts or divert resources for personal benefits, such as, for example, career concerns. For the political view of state ownership, government-owned banks are inefficient because of the politicians' deliberate policy of transferring resources to their supporters (Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . It has been underlined that state-owned banks have poorer loan quality and higher default risk than private-owned banks (Berger et al., 2005; Iannotta et al., 2007) . Iannota et al, 2007 also highlight that mutual banks and government-owned banks appear as less profitable than private-owned banks. Moreover, they find that government-owned banks have poorer loan quality and higher default risk, while mutual banks have better loan quality and lower asset risk than both private and government-owned banks. In addition, some papers have shown that foreign-owned banks exhibit a higher performance than other banks, particularly in developing countries (Claessens et al., 2001; Bonin et al, 2005; Micco et al., 2007) .
Beside the issues of the manager-owner conflict and the differences between state and private-owned firms, there are other aspects that are well developed in the literature on non financial firms but not in the literature on financial firms. First, institutional investors who exercise significant voting power can shape the nature of corporate risk taking. Institutional investors can exert greater control for reasons of economies of scale in corporate supervision. Pound (1988) highlights that institutional investors can exercise a control at a lower cost as they have more experience. There is also the possibility, however, that managers and institutional investors form an alliance, so that insider interests could take priority over the maximization of firm value. At the same time, as institutional investors have a diversified portfolio of investments, they may have fewer incentives to exercise control. Empirical evidence (Acker and Athanassakos, 2003) , based on non financial firms, do not show conclusive results on the effect of control by institutional investors on firm value. Second, family-owned firms are perceived as less willing to take risk but also as less profitable. More generally, firms with large, undiversified owners such as founding families may forgo maximum profits because they have an undiversified wealth and they are unable to separate their financial preferences from those of outside shareholders. Families also limit executive management positions to family members, suggesting a restricted labor pool from which to obtain qualified and capable talent, potentially leading to competitive disadvantages relatively to non family-owned firms (Morck et al, 2000) . However, James (1999) posits that families have longer investment horizons, leading to greater investment efficiency. Stein (1988 Stein ( , 1989 shows that the presence of shareholders with relatively long investment horizons can mitigate the incentives for myopic investment decisions by managers. Regarding the banking industry, few papers analyze this issue. considers different forms of bank ownership including state-owned, foreign-owned, company-owned and family-owned banks but not banks owned by institutional investors. Working on a panel of Asian banks before the Asian crisis of 1997, he finds that family-owned banks were among the most risky banks together with company-owned banks whereas foreign-owned banks took little risk relatively to other banks.
The objective of this paper is to extend the current literature dedicated to the risktaking incentives of bank shareholders in several directions. First, we work on a broader classification of shareholders by considering the equity held by managers, institutional investors, non financial companies, individuals and families, banks, foundations/research institutes and governments. Second, we consider the proportion of equity held by each category of owner, instead of using dummy variables to divide ownership into mutually exclusive categories as in most of the previous studies on bank ownership (Berger et al., 2005; Bonin et al., 2005; Boubakri et al., 2005; Williams and Nguyen, 2005) . This approach allows us to analyze how the interaction of equity held by different types of shareholders influences the risk-taking behavior of banks. It also allows us to study the link between ownership structure and risk more deeply by dealing with the issue of possible coalitions among different categories or groups. Nevertheless, for consistency with previous studies we also study the link between risk and the nature of the main shareholder. Third, by investigating the link between ownership structure and risk for both listed (publicly held) and non-listed (privately owned) banks we question the ability of market forces to influence bank risk-taking behavior (market discipline) under different ownership arrangements. Fourth, previous studies that use a detailed breakdown of the stakes held by different categories of owners were mostly dedicated to US banks and could not consider as many categories of shareholders because ownership of banks by non-financial companies is not permitted. By working on European banks we are therefore able to introduce an additional category which the literature considers as playing a very controversial role in the management of financial institutions. Studies on European banks have focused on the nature of ownership (public, private, mutual, cooperative…) rather than on the structure of ownership in private banks. We focus on commercial banks only, that is firms that are assumed to have identical objectives, and to our knowledge this is the first study that looks at the relationship between ownership structure and risk for European commercial banks.
We work on a panel of European banks through the period 1999-2005. Two main results emerge from our study. First, we find that banks with different types of ownership structures have different attitudes in terms of risk-taking. We find a negative relationship between the proportion of stock held by families and individuals and asset risk, and a positive relationship between default risk and the proportion of stocks held by institutional investors or non-financial companies. Second, we find that market forces seem to limit risk-taking incentives as such results mainly hold for non-listed banks. Nevertheless, we also show that market forces might be more effective in influencing risk in banks with a higher involvement of non-financial companies than in banks with a higher proportion of stock held by institutional investors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data and variables. Section 3 presents the methodology and the hypotheses tested. The empirical results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 reports robustness checks and discusses further issues. Section 6 concludes the paper. Table A1 in the appendix for further details on the distribution of banks by country). We also consider a subsample that satisfies the criteria that the sum of the different shares that are displayed in Bankscope is at least equal to 99% 5 .
Data
This criteria leaves us with 198 banks, within which 29 are listed. We test the robustness of our results by running our estimations on both the large sample of 249 banks and on the restricted sample of 198 banks.
Descriptive statistics of our large sample of 249 banks are presented in Table 1 . We use data from consolidated accounts if available and from unconsolidated accounts otherwise.
Insert Table 1 here
Ownership variables
In our study, we code the ownership structure based on the stockholder information contained in the BankScope database. Two criteria are used to select the categories of owners.
First, we require each category of owner to hold a positive percentage of equity in at least 5
banks. This criteria leads us to exclude three categories of owners, which are Government, self owned and foundation. Second, we only consider the categories of owners for which we are able to identify their nature, behavior and incentives to take risk. We therefore exclude three categories of owners provided by BankScope: public, unnamed private shareholders and other unnamed shareholders.
Consequently, we end up with five categories of owners that are considered in our create five variables which report for each bank in our sample the proportion of equity held by each category of owner. Table 2 shows that managers hold equity in only 8 banks out of which 7 are listed banks. Table 3 , which provides statistics on the percentage of equity held by the different types of owners, also highlights that the proportion of stocks held by managers is very low (0.30%) compared to the other types of owners. Individuals and families are also involved in a relatively few number of listed and non-listed banks (25 banks) in our sample of European commercial banks (see Table 2 ). Individuals and families are more often involved in listed banks (see Table 2 ) but they hold a higher proportion of equity in privately-owned banks (2.68%) than in listed banks (1.17%) (see Table 3 ). Institutional investors hold equity in 55
banks. The proportion of stock held by institutional investors is on average equal to 7.81% (see Table 3 ) and this category of shareholders is more focused on listed banks (see Table 2 ).
Non-financial companies are strongly involved in commercial banks as they hold equity in 78 banks out of the 249 banks of our sample. Companies are more often involved in listed banks but they hold a higher proportion of equity in non-listed banks (see Tables 2 and 3 ). The major shareholders of banks are other banking institutions with an average of 58.92% of equity but mainly in non-listed banks ( Table 2 ). The proportion of equity held by other banking institutions is higher in non-listed banks (74.88%) than in listed banks (25.23%) (Table 3) .
We compare our sample with the larger population of banks contained in Bankscope by looking at possible differences between the importance of each category of owner in our sample of 249 banks and those of the largest sample of 905 banks for which Bankscope Fitch IBCA provides information on the ownership structure in 2005. The frequencies of banks for which each category of owner holds a positive percentage of equity in our sample (see Table   2 ) are not significantly different from those of the largest sample of 905 banks (see Table A2 in appendix). Similarly, the average percentage of equity held by the five categories of owners that we consider is not significantly different in our sample of 249 banks and in the larger sample of 905 banks.
Insert Tables 2 and 3 here   Table 4 Insert Table 4 2.3 Risk variables Table 4 provides statistics for different measures of asset risk and default risk commonly used in the literature. We compute three standard measures of risk for each bank throughout the period based on annual accounting data: the standard deviation of the return on average assets (SD_ROA), the standard deviation of the return on average equity (SD_ROE), and the mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans (M_LLP). We also compute default risk measures. First we use the "Z-score" proposed by Boyd and Graham (1986) which indicates the probability of failure of a given bank (Z) 6 . Second, we use the ZP Score (ZP) as in Goyeau and Tarazi (1992) and Lepetit et al. (2008) and its two additive components 7 (ZP1 and ZP2). ZP1 is a measure of bank portfolio risk whereas ZP2 is a measure of leverage risk. In table 4, we present the mean of each risk and default indicator for each of our five categories of owners according to the proportion of equity they hold. Table 4 shows sufficient heterogeneity in different types of shareholders, enabling us to analyze the behavior of banks depending on their ownership structure.
Method and hypotheses tested
Our objective is first to analyze how the proportion of equity held by different types of shareholders influences the risk-taking behavior of European commercial banks. Second, our aim is also to investigate whether market discipline can influence the relationship between ownership structure and risk. We therefore test two hypotheses by specifying two specifications of our model. Alternatively, we also consider two other dependent variables, which are the mean of the return on average asset (M_ROA) and the mean of the return on average equity (M_ROE) to investigate the link between ownership structure and bank profitability.
We consider five categories of owners that may influence the incentives of banks to take on more risk. The variable MANAGER is the proportion of stock held by managers/directors. When a manager/director holds a small share of the bank's equity, she may have incentives to take less risk. If the bank fails, she loses both her reputation and human capital investment. This variable is very close to the proxy used by Saunders et al (1990) which is estimated as the number of shares held by executive and directors divided by the total of shares outstanding. Note that the underlying assumption in the literature is that a low proportion of stocks held by managers is associated with a low share of the bank's stocks in the managers' non-human wealth. Also, a higher proportion of stocks held by managers is assumed to align their interest with those of shareholders as long as the larger investment in the bank's stocks does not prevent them from holding diversified portfolios. The relationship between risk and MANAGER is therefore expected to be positive ( 1 0 α > ) 8 (Saunders et al., 1990; Knop et Teall, 1996; Anderson and Fraser, 2000) as long as the increase in managers/directors' stock holding does not prevent them from holding diversified portfolios.
The variable FAMILY is the proportion of stocks held by individuals and families. We expect the coefficient of FAMILY to be negative ( 2 0 α < ). In general, their portfolio is less diversified than those of other shareholders. They have incentives to take less risk because if the bank fails they lose more compared to other shareholders.
The variable INSTITUT is the proportion of stocks held by institutional investors.
Institutional investors will encourage more risky activities that maximize bank value because their portfolios are sufficiently diversified. The expected coefficient of this variable is positive ( 3 0 α > ). However, institutional investors that do not engage in long term investments are less motivated to control managers. Also, as argued above, since institutional investors hold diversified portfolios, they might have lower incentives to exert control and therefore the coefficient of this variable might not be significant. In our study, INSTITUT is defined in such a way that only stable stakes of such investors are taken into account. As explained above, the observations for which the proportions of stakes are significantly different over time are omitted.
We also consider shares held by non-financial companies (COMPANY). Banks with a large portion of stocks held by firms are prone to increase the riskiness of loans granted to owners. Moreover, if a bank is behind an industrial group, the group management will have incentives to manipulate the bank to maximize the wealth of ultimate owners. We therefore expect a positive coefficient associated to the variable Company ( 4 0 α > ).
The fifth category of shareholders is banks (BANK). As we can see in Tables 2 and 3 A set of control variables are introduced to account for size differences (natural logarithm of total assets M_LNTA), business differences (deposits to total assets (M_DEP)) and leverage differences (M_EQUITY). Alternative control variables (the ratio of loans to total assets and the ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income), as well as the mean of the annual growth rate of total assets to capture the effect on risk of growth strategies and acquisitions, are also introduced to check for robustness. Because M_LNTA and M_EQUITY are highly correlated, the leverage ratio is orthogonalized with total assets (M_OEQUITY). As the information on the ownership structure of our sample of banks is invariant through time (1999-2005 period) and as our measure of asset risk and default risk are computed using the standard deviations of ROA and ROE, we conduct cross-section regressions. We therefore compute the means of our three control variables over the whole sample period. We also include a dummy variable, LISTED, which takes the value of one if 9 The choice to remove the variable BANK is based on its high correlation both with the variables COMPANY and INSTITUT. 10 We have 198 banks for which the sum of the different percentages that are displayed in Bankscope is at least equal to 99%.
the bank is listed on the stock market and zero otherwise. This dummy variable is expected to capture differences in risk taking for listed and non-listed banks.
To investigate the issue of market discipline, we also test the extent to which market discipline influences the incentives of different categories of bank shareholders to take risk. Tables 5 and 6 show the results obtained for Models 1 and 2 with cross section OLS estimations with t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity following White's methodology. .
Results
Our results are consistent with hypothesis 1. We find that the portion of total equity held by different categories of shareholders is significant in explaining risk differences.
First, as expected, our results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between the FAMILY ownership component and the two measures of asset risk (SDROA and SDROE) ( Table 5 ). Higher portions of total stock held by individuals and families (compensated in our model by a decrease in the BANK component, (see appendix 2)), are associated with lower asset risk. As argued above, such shareholders hold less diversified portfolios and are often involved in the management of such banks. However, our results highlight that the level of involvement of individuals and families does not influence the proxy we use for credit risk (M_LLP) as well as bank default risk (Z and ZP).
Second, we find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of equity held by institutional investors and the proxy for credit risk M_LLP (Table 5 ). This result indicates that loans are more risky in banks where a higher portion of total stocks is held by institutional investors. Such investors are expected to pursue firm value maximization strategies and their portfolio is generally well diversified. Interestingly, we also find a negative and significant coefficient associated to INSTITUT for our different measures of default risk. The probability of default of banks increases when institutional investors hold a higher proportion of total equity. Third, the portion of equity held by non financial companies does not significantly influence the riskiness of bank assets. This result is not consistent with the findings of Boubakri et al. (2005) who show that industrial groups-controlled banks are the ones with the highest risk exposure in developing countries. However, our results show that default risk (ZP, ZP1 and ZP2) is higher when the portion of shares held by such firms increases.
Finally, we do not find any significant relationship between the level of manager's equity and our risk and default measures. This result is not consistent with previous studies on US banks which find a significant effect of managerial ownership on risk-taking but without any consensus on the sign of this relationship (Saunders et al,1990; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Knopf and Teall, 1996; Chen et al., 1998; Anderson and Fraser, 2000) . However, it should be noted that our data do not allow us to infer any accurate relationship between manager involvement and risk. As shown by table 2 and table A2, managers rarely hold stocks in their own company in our sample. Moreover, 7 out the 8 banks in which they have a stake are listed banks.
Insert Table 5 here Regarding the influence of market forces on risk-taking, the coefficient associated to the variable LISTED in Model 1 (Table 5) is not significant, except for SDROA and ZP1. At first sight, there seems to be no significant difference in risk between listed and non listed banks suggesting that market forces might not strongly influence the risk behavior of listed banks in a specific way. However, our results show that listed banks exhibit lower income variability (standard deviation of the ROA) and are more profitable than non-listed banks.
We further investigate the issue of market discipline with Model 2 by considering the interaction between the portion of equity held by each category of owner and the exposure of banks to market forces (Table 6) 12 . We find a negative and significant relationship between the proportion of stocks held by non-financial companies and the measures of default (ZP and ZP1) for non-listed banks but not for listed banks. Therefore, our results indicate that the higher probability of default associated to banks with a higher portion of equity held by non financial companies only holds for non-listed banks. Market forces might therefore actually discipline the risk-taking of such banks when they are listed.
Also, a higher default risk is associated to non-listed banks with a larger involvement of institutional investors. For most of our default risk measures (Z, ZP and ZP2) such a result also holds for listed banks suggesting that the market might be less effective in influencing the risk behavior of such banks. However, the coefficient of our proxy of credit risk M_LLP is no longer significant for listed banks implying that loans are less risky when such banks are listed and therefore exposed to market forces. Regarding family ownership, we find a negative and significant relationship between FAMILY and asset risk (standard deviation ROA) for both non-listed and listed banks. Therefore, our above result showing a lower risk in banks with a higher stake of family-type shareholders holds for both listed and non-listed banks.
Insert Table 6 here 12 We do not include MANAGER in Model 2 because, in our sample, only one bank involving managerial shareholding is not listed (see Table2) .
Robustness checks and further issues 13
Several robustness checks are performed. We run separate regressions introducing our ownership variables one by one along with the control variables. All conclusions concerning the variables of interest remain unchanged. In addition to our previous results, we find, as expected, that there is a significant and negative relationship between the proxy of credit risk (M_LLP) and the proportion of total equity held by banks. The results also show that a higher proportion of equity held by banks is associated to a lower probability of default.
We also estimate Model 1 and Model 2 using the restricted sample of 198 banks for which the sum of the different equity components is at least equal to 99%. We consider this restricted sample to ensure that our results are not biased by the fact that some information regarding ownership structure might be missing or not reported in the Bankscope dataset that we use. Our conclusions regarding the inclusion of ownership variables remain unchanged.
We further perform a number of robustness checks that are specification related. First, we include country dummies to capture the presence of country specific effects. Second, other control variables to account for business differences are introduced in the estimations such as the ratio of loans to total assets and the ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income. We also run our estimations by introducing the mean of the annual growth rate of total assets. An increase in a bank's total assets is presumed to capture the effect on risk of growth strategies and acquisitions experienced by many European banks in the early 2000's.
Our conclusions regarding our ownership variables are unaltered.
Eventually, to further examine issues related to the influence of ownership structure on the risk-taking behaviour of banks, we carry out a deeper investigation of our sample.
We conduct our estimations separately for large banks (total assets > 1 billion Euros) and small banks (total assets < 1 billion Euros) to further check for size effects on the relationship between ownership structure and banks' behaviour in terms of risk taking. Table   A3 in appendix presents the results obtained for Model 1 14 . Ownership variables are significant in explaining risk differences for both the sample of large and small banks which is consistent with hypothesis 1. 13 The results from the estimations conducted in this section are available from the authors on request. 14 The distribution of the proportion of equity held by the different categories of owners for the sample of small banks does not allow us to run our estimations for Model 2. Table 4 ). We create the following four dummy variables which take the value of one when ownership is higher than 33% of the equity and 0 otherwise: FAMILY_OWNED, INSITUT_OWNED, COMPANY_OWNED and BANK_OWNED. We do not consider in our estimations manager-owned banks because only one bank has a majority of equity held by managers (see Table 4 ). We also exclude the variable BANK_OWNED due to its high correlation with the variables INSTITUT_OWNED and COMPANY_OWNED. Table A4 in appendix shows the results of the estimations for Model 1 16 . We find that the probability of default is higher when the major category of owners is institutional investors compared to banks for which the main category of owners is banking institutions. But we do not find any difference in risk-taking behavior between banks which are majority-owned by non financial companies and those which are majority-owned by banking institutions. Our results also show that banks which are majority-owned by families and individuals exhibit a lower credit risk level. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the nature of the majority shareholder influences the risk-taking behavior of banks.
Our results therefore highlight that both the degree of involvement of shareholders and the nature of the main category of shareholders influence the attitude of banks toward risk.
Summary and concluding remarks
The objective of this study was to analyze if the risk-taking behavior of banks is influenced by their ownership structure. We differentiate five categories of shareholders who have different risk-taking incentives (managers/directors, institutional investors, non-financial companies, individual and family investors, and banks). Our aim was also to assess if market discipline influences the incentives of different categories of bank shareholders to take risk.
Working on a panel of European commercial banks and using both asset risk and default risk measures, we find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk 15 Out of these 6 family-owned banks, 2 banks also have one other major shareholder. 16 The number of banks for which we have a majority owner do not allow us to run estimations for Model 2.
differences. Specifically, we find that asset risk is lower in banks where a higher proportion of total stocks is held by families and individuals and that the probability of default of banks is higher when non-financial companies and institutional investors hold a higher proportion of total equity. Our results further highlight that market forces might actually discipline the risktaking behavior of such investors as the positive relationship between the proportion of equity held by non-financial companies and default risk only holds for non-listed banks. Our findings regarding market discipline are however less robust for institutional investors than for non financial companies. Therefore, our study suggests that market discipline might be less effective to curb the risk-taking behavior of institutional investors than the shareholder risk-taking incentives of non-financial companies. A closer look shows that listed banks with higher stakes of institutional investors exhibit higher profitability than their non-listed counterparts. Conversely, for banks with a higher involvement of non-financial firms there is no significant difference in profitability between listed and non-listed institutions. Therefore, whereas higher default risk is offset by higher profitability for banks dominated by institutional investors, such a result cannot be observed for banks influenced by non-financial firms. On the whole, the market might be counteracting the behavior of banks controlled by non-financial firms by limiting inefficient risk-taking (bad risk) but not the efficient risktaking (good risk) of institutional investors. which is in million of euros): LOANS = net loans/total assets; DEP = deposits/total assets; EQUITY= equity/total assets; EXPENSES =personnel expenses/total assets; LLP = loan loss provision/net loans; ROA = return on average assets; ROE= return on average equity; LIQUID = liquid assets/total assets; OBS= off balance sheet/ total assets; TA= total assets (thousand Euros); SDROA= standard deviation of the ROA; Z = Z-score. [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] : SDROA= standard deviation of the return on average assets; SDROE = standard deviation of return on average equity, MLLP_NL = Mean of the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans over the sample period; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; ZP1=measure of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk. [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] : SDROA= standard deviation of the return on average assets; SDROE = standard deviation of the return on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; ZP1=measure of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average equity;; M_LNTA= mean of logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets orthogonalized with TA; M_DEPOSIT = mean of the ratio of deposits to total assets; LISTED= dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is listed on a stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. The variables MANAGER, FAMILY, INSTITUT and COMPANY represent the percentage of stock held respectively by managers, families and individuals, institutional investors and non-financial companies. [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] : SDROA= standard deviation of the return on average assets; SDROE = standard deviation of the return on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; ZP1=measure of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average equity; M_LNTA= mean of logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets orthogonalized with TA; M_DEPOSIT = mean of the ratio of deposits to total assets. The variables FAMILY, INSTITUT and COMPANY represent the percentage of stock held respectively by families and individuals, institutional investors and non-financial companies. 
Appendix 2
Our Model 1 is defined as: 
